Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
C ommercial casino gambling is a major industry that has experienced substantial growth in recent decades. Garrett and Nichols (2008) note that the casino gambling industry had reached $44 billion in adjusted gross revenue in 2003, which accounted for about 60 percent of all gambling revenues in the U.S.
1 Landers (2007) shows that casino gambling tax collections constitute a signifi cant portion of total state tax collections in many states, with the highest share (16.3 percent) in Nevada as of FY2006.
2 State fi scal crises have also led many states to turn to gambling as a quick solution to state fi scal problems in recent times.
3 Given this, it is important to show what those states might expect from commercial gambling in the future. A relevant question, then, is how gross gambling revenues differ from other traditional major state tax bases, such as sales and income, in growth and variability.
While past studies on income elasticity of state taxes used calculated tax bases or national proxies, the literature also discussed the problems with this approach and advised using actual tax bases (e.g., Holcombe and Sobel, 1997) . In addition, most studies used annual instead of quarterly data, missing the more accurate picture of changes in economic activity during a given year. We also see a gap in the literature as we have not come across any recent studies on the income elasticity of gross gambling revenues despite major changes in the gambling industry, particularly in the last two decades. We are addressing these weaknesses in the literature by estimating the long-run and short-run income elasticities of the actual tax base of gross gambling revenues using state-level quarterly data on gross gambling revenue and state, regional and national income. 4 Our empirical analysis includes 11 states that have signifi cant casino gambling. We group these states as follows: Nevada, New Jersey, Mississippi (Destination Resorts); 5 Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri (Riverboat Casinos); Colorado, South Dakota (Mining Towns); and Connecticut (Indian Casinos). To estimate income elasticities, we run separate time-series regressions for each of these states, controlling for supply-side industry effects. Our fi ndings show that growth in Nevada's tax base is more sensitive to changes in national than state income, while such growth is more tied to state and regional income than national income in other states. Gross casino revenue growth is generally faster than taxable sales, but slower than taxable income. Short-run (immediate) elasticity is, on average, lower than estimates for sales and income taxes, with an equal or more rapid adjustment to long-run equilibrium.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the literature on the income elasticity of state taxes, including a small literature on gross gambling revenues. We provide a detailed description of our empirical model and data in the third section. In the fourth section we present our empirical results from a regression analysis. We summarize our results and provide a discussion with our concluding remarks in the fi nal section.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Earlier studies on the income elasticity of state taxes gave only long-run estimates of income elasticities. The seminal paper by Groves and Kahn (1952) used double-log OLS specifi cation to estimate long-run income elasticity of various state taxes using annual tax revenue data. Cargill and Eadington (1978) and Babbel and Staking (1983) followed suit. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, these two are the only studies that examined income elasticity of gambling, and Cargill and Eadington (1978) is the only one that has examined casino gambling specifi cally. 6 Cargill and Eadington used seasonally adjusted data for the period [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] and found that the income elasticity of gross gambling revenue is fairly elastic with significant variation across three 4 Gross gambling revenue is the actual base that comprises what is often referred to as the wagering tax or percentage fee tax. The wagering tax, however, does not comprise the total tax base of the state. Most riverboat states, for example, will collect an admissions tax. Many other states will collect "device taxes," which are quarterly and annual fees imposed per device, i.e., slot machines and tables. The wagering tax, however, is by far the largest component of total taxes collected. For example, in fi scal year 2007 wagering taxes comprised 82.5 percent of total casino taxes in Nevada, 90.1 percent in Indiana, and 94.2 percent in Illinois. South Dakota has the smallest percentage at 50.7 percent.
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The term "destination resort casinos" was coined by Eadington (1998). 6 Suits (1979) examined gambling tax revenues by looking at the price elasticity of demand for gambling. Landers (2007) examined demand elasticity for gambling with respect to changes in the win percentage. Babbel and Staking (1983) estimated the Engel Curve for lottery expenditures and life insurance in Brazil using the double-log OLS specifi cation and found that lotteries have close to unitary income elasticity. regions in Nevada. The highest is in the Las Vegas region (1.75), followed by the Lake Tahoe (1.25) and the Reno-Sparks (1.05) regions. Cargill and Eadington used California personal income in the regressions for income elasticity to capture the responsiveness of gambling revenue to regional income changes. This is important since the casino gambling industry in most states is driven by visitors to the state from the neighboring region.
In the next phase of the literature, studies distinguished between growth and variability of tax bases by separately estimating long-run and short-run elasticities. 7 In one of the earlier studies, Fox and Campbell (1984) used a varying elasticity model to estimate various short-run elasticities for ten different categories of sales tax bases in Tennessee. Also differently, they use quarterly data on the sales tax base, calculated from sales tax revenue data. They note the advantages of using quarterly data as having more degrees of freedom and allowing a closer link between economic activity and consumption. They found that sales tax is an unstable revenue source as the short-run elasticities move in a procyclical fashion. 8 Dye and McGuire (1991) extended this analysis by showing evidence of both growth and variability in state income and sales taxes. They did this by estimating the trend rate of growth and the deviation from trend for different components of these tax bases.
9 They found that taxes with high long-run elasticity (e.g., income tax) can be more stable than a tax with lower long-run elasticity (e.g., sales tax). Hence, the trade-off between growth and variability in state taxes may not hold.
They used national data to approximate tax bases for states. While this brought signifi cant simplicity in the analysis of income elasticities for different states, it also led to a potential error in the use of appropriate tax bases. Sobel and Holcombe (1996) also distinguished between long-run and short-run income elasticities, but their econometric approach is different from the previous studies. While they used a Dynamic OLS (DOLS) specification for the long-run elasticity estimation, they used an Error Correction Model to estimate short-run elasticities. They argue that the Error Correction Model gives superior results compared to Dye and McGuire's deviation from trend approach in the presence of non-stationarity in tax revenues. Similarly to Dye and McGuire (1991) , Sobel and Holcombe (1996) used proxies for bases of various taxes. In a related and expanded study, Holcombe and Sobel (1997) addressed cyclical variability in state individual income and state retail sales taxes using federal adjusted gross income in the state and total state retail sales, respectively, as tax bases.
10 They, too, did not fi nd evidence of a tradeoff between variability and growth in state tax bases, except in the case of food exemption from the retail sales tax base. A recent study by Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) improved on the previous studies by using state-level data for tax bases instead of national proxies. Their data procedure still falls short of using data on actual tax bases since they calculate tax bases from state tax revenue data. They also contribute by showing the asymmetry in short-run elasticities. Short-run elasticity estimates could be signifi cantly different depending on whether current revenue is above or below the long-run equilibrium.
We build on the literature discussed above but make several improvements and contributions. First, we use quarterly data as in Fox and Campbell (1984) , but expand the analysis to a number of states instead of just one. Second, we use data on the actual tax base for the fi rst time in the literature, thus removing the potential error inherent in previous studies that used proxies. Third, we are adding a new estimate of the income elasticity of gross casino gambling revenues to the list of past elasticity estimates that included state taxes like the individual income tax, general sales tax, corporate income tax, motor fuel tax, tobacco tax and alcohol tax. Finally, we also examine the responsiveness of the tax base to changes in regional income in the vicinity of the state and changes in national income. This is important since casino gambling revenues might be quite sensitive to visitors from the state's region or even from the entire nation, as in the case of Nevada.
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
This study uses econometric methodologies developed by Sobel and Holcombe (1996) and Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) to estimate the short-run and long-run income elasticities of gross casino gambling revenue. Unlike these and the studies reviewed above, however, the current study examines a very specifi c tax base, gross casino gambling revenue, rather than a broad base such as taxable sales or income. This requires that some specifi c, supply-side characteristics of the industry be accounted for.
Long-Run Elasticity
In many states, casino gambling is restricted either geographically and/or with a set number of licenses. Thus, while gross gambling revenue has the unique attribute of being the actual base that is taxed, unlike many other taxable items it is generated in a supply-constrained environment. In nearly all states except Nevada and New Jersey the number of licenses is limited. Even Nevada restricts casinos to certain locations and New Jersey allows casinos only in Atlantic City. Given this, casino gambling revenue may change due to demand changes, such as changes in personal income, or supply changes, such as changes in the number of casinos or gambling positions (i.e., number of slots and tables). Failure to account for supply-driven changes may lead to an omitted variable bias in estimates of the income elasticity, since changes to gross revenue resulting from, for example, an expansion in the number of slot machines would be attributed to a change in income.
The basic model used to estimate the long-run elasticity of demand is given by:
where R j,t is the natural log of gross casino gambling revenue for state j at time t, INC j,t is a measure of income, such as the natural log of state personal income, for state j at time t, SLOTS j,t-2 is the natural log of the number of slot machines in state j at time t -2, i.e., lagged two quarters, TABLES j,t-2 is the natural log of the number of tables games in state j at time t -2, and S t represents seasonal dummies for Spring, Summer, and Fall to account for potential seasonal variation in gambling revenue. Slots and tables are lagged two quarters to avoid any potential simultaneity bias with gross gambling revenue.
The coeffi cient on INC j,t will provide the income elasticity of demand, thereby predicting the long-run response of the tax base to a change in income. SLOTS j,t-2 and TABLES j,t-2 are included to ensure that the impacts on the tax base from relaxing regulatory constraints, such as a new or expanded casino, or a change in the mix of slots versus tables, are not attributed to a change in income. Generally, however, there are very few major regulatory changes during our sample period and, as will be discussed later, we purposely exclude the periods when casinos are first legalized and initially expanding. As further evidence of the reliability of our elasticity estimates, lagging slots and tables zero, one, or three quarters yields similar results, while excluding slots and tables from the regressions resulted in only slightly larger elasticity estimates but did not change the qualitative conclusions.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the variables in Equation [1] reveal the variables to be nonstationary. However, both the Engle-Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) tests reveal a cointegrating relationship amongst the variables in equation [1] . Nevertheless, Watson (1993, 2007) note that statistical inferences from equation [1] may not be valid because of the non-normal distribution of the OLS estimator. To account for this, it is recommended to use the dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. This involves estimating the following equation with Newey-West (1987) standard errors:
where ΔINC j,t is the change in the natural log of income, with the number of lags and leads determined using the Bayesian Information Criterion (Stock and Watson, 2007) .
Short-Run Elasticity
Following Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006), short-run elasticity estimates are derived from an Error-Correction Model (ECM) allowing for asymmetric income elasticity and adjustment to equilibrium. Thus, in the short run, changes to the tax base may come from changes in income or an adjustment toward the long-run cointegrating relationship derived from equation [2] ), both of which may differ depending on whether the actual tax base is above or below the long-run value. Moreover, for reasons described above, the tax base may change due to supply characteristics, particularly a change to the number of slot machines or table games. Consequently, short-run elasticities are estimated using the following model:
where variables are described as above and D j,t = 1 if ε j,t > 0 in equation [2] above. ε j,t-1 is the error correction term and β 6 captures the adjustment in period t to the disequilibrium in period t -1, i.e., the difference between the last period's actual tax base and the long-run cointegrating relationship predicted by equation [2] . The inclusion of the interaction term, D j,t-1 *ε j,t-1 , allows for this adjustment to differ depending on whether the actual tax base is above or below its long-run value. and 2001Q1-Q4 recessions as defi ned by the National Bureau of Economic Research, and found no asymmetry in either the short-run elasticity or adjustment. Moreover, we estimate equation [3] setting D = 1 when income growth was above trend as determined using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) fi lter. Doing so, we fi nd the greatest evidence of asymmetry when examining state income. However, we only fi nd asymmetry in the short-run state elasticity for two states (IN, LA), and in the adjustment for three (IA,MO, LA).
Data
The Given the variation across states, we estimate state-specifi c elasticities. Moreover, to our knowledge, this is the fi rst study to have data on the actual tax base. Previous studies, for example, have had to estimate taxable sales or taxable income using national (Sobel and Holcombe, 1996) or state-specifi c (Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle, 2006) proxies. In the case of casino gambling, however, the taxable gross revenue base is publicly available.
Income data consists of real state, regional, or national income, expressed in millions of 2006:Q1 dollars. We chose these three measures of income because we anticipate that national income, for example, may be important for Nevada, which attracts a national clientele, whereas state and/or regional income may be more relevant for the other states. Income data are gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data on slots and tables, where available, are gathered from various state gambling control boards and commissions. Summary statistics on the regression variables are given in Table 1 . Table 2 provides long-run income elasticity estimates for gross casino gambling revenue. The results are organized by the type of industry structure in which the casinos operate. For example, destination resort casinos are tourist destinations that offer many amenities, including hotels, restaurants, and entertainment, and usually contain multiple casinos in a single location. Mississippi is also included in this category, mostly to account for Biloxi/ Gulfport and Tunica, although it also has characteristics that are common with the next category-Riverboat Casinos (Vicksburg, Greenville). Riverboat casinos are usually single casinos located near or on a river. These are mostly attractive to residents living nearby the casino, usually within 50 miles. South Dakota and Colorado have casinos that are located in former mining towns and are generally smaller-scale operations than Riverboat casinos. Finally, Connecticut has Indian 12 All revenue data are thousands 2006 fi rst quarter dollars, adjusted using the CPI. 13 Our analysis only includes traditional, privately owned casinos. We exclude states such as Delaware, Rhode Island, and West Virginia, which have video lottery terminals (VLTs) at racetracks that are operated by the state lottery. While VLTs are similar to slot machines, they are controlled in a monopoly environment by the state lottery and, hence, distinct from the traditional casinos that have expanded across the country. Moreover, VLT data are diffi cult to obtain and the expansion of VLTs is relatively recent, limiting the number of available observations. 14 Data from Nevada are available at http://gaming.nv.gov/. (2006) and Holcombe and Sobel (1997) .
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Elasticities from Holcombe and Sobel (1997) Before discussing the results, it is important to note that data on the number of slot machines or tables were not available for Louisiana and New Jersey. To account for any regulatory induced impacts on gross revenue, dummy variables were used to account for signifi cant legislative and regulatory changes, which would logically result in an expansion of gambling. For example, in Louisiana dummy variables are used to account for the offering of video poker machines outside of casinos (beginning 1997:q3), the opening of a land-based casino in New Orleans (beginning 1999:q4), and the introduction of slot machines at racetracks (beginning 2002:q2). In New Jersey, prior to July 1991, slot machines, which generate approximately 70-80 percent of gross casino revenue, were restricted to no more than 45 percent of total casino fl oor space. After July 1991, this was allowed to increase to a maximum of 75 percent. A dummy variable equal to one after 1991:q3 is used to capture this expansion of slot machines.
Lastly, the sample period over which the above regressions are run varies by state, with Nevada having the largest sample size (1983:q2-2006:q2) and Indiana having the smallest (1997:q1-2006:q2). The period when casinos are fi rst legalized results in remarkable growth in gross casino revenue as new casinos open. To avoid the bias this growth could introduce to the long-run elasticity estimates, starting dates for each state omit the early quarters of operation. Specifi cally, starting dates are selected using Hansen's (1992) test of model stability, with the sample size consisting of the maximum possible number of observations that enables the null hypothesis of model stability not to be rejected. Table 2 provides DOLS estimates of the long-run elasticity of gross gambling revenue along with Newey-West standard errors. Also included for comparison purposes are the long-run elasticities for sales and income taxes taken from Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) or Holcombe and Sobel (1997) . All long-run elasticities are statistically signifi cant with the exception of Indiana.
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The results in Table 2 suggest that jurisdictions such as Nevada and New Jersey have much lower long-run elasticities than the other jurisdictions, reflecting their relative maturity (Nevada legalized gambling in 1931, and New Jersey, in 1976). Indeed, over time, long-run elasticities have fallen in both states. For example, prior to 1994 (the date divides the sample in half), long-run elasticity estimates in Nevada are 0.33, 0.76, and 0.87 for state, regional, and national income, respectively, compared to 0.24, 0.42, and 0.47 afterwards. Repeating the analysis for New Jersey yields elasticity estimates of 0.90, 0.93, and 1.00 prior to 1995, versus 0.17, 0.19, and 0.16 afterwards. The differences between the estimates are signifi cant at the one percent level, with the exception of the state income elasticity estimates for Nevada, which are signifi cant at the fi ve percent level.
Of all the states examined, Nevada is the most unique. Its total casino revenues are twice that of Atlantic City, New Jersey, the second largest market in the country. Of all jurisdictions, Nevada, particularly Las Vegas, is the only one that would be considered a national, and even international, destination. The other destination resort communities, Atlantic City and Mississippi, are primarily regional destinations (Garrett and Nichols, 2008) . Thus, the national income elasticity estimate is likely the best long-run measure for Nevada. While statistically significant national income estimates are found in most other states, this likely refl ects its high correlation with state and regional income. Indeed, with the exception of Nevada, New Jersey, and Missouri, all long-run income elasticities are statistically equal to one. Therefore, state governments can generally predict that the tax base and, hence, tax revenue, will grow at roughly the same rate as state income.
How do the income elasticities of gross casino revenue compare with a state's traditional tax bases of sales and income? Table 2 includes estimates of sales and income tax elasticities from Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) or Holcombe and Sobel (1997) . 18 In general, the income elasticity of gross gambling revenue lies between the income elasticity of sales and income. The exceptions are Nevada and New Jersey, where the income elasticities for gross gambling revenue are less than the income elasticity of taxable sales, and Illinois, South Dakota, and Connecticut, where the income elasticities of gross gambling revenue are greater than the income elasticity of taxable income, although not statistically so.
Panel Regressions
Data for each state are pooled to do a panel estimation of overall long-run income elasticity of gross casino revenues. Two conventional approaches for estimating panel data are the fi xed-effects and random-effects procedures. In a randomeffects model, the assumption is that fi xed effects and all other regressors are uncorrelated. However, if they are correlated, the coeffi cient estimates of the regressors in a random-effects model will be inconsistent and systematically different from those for a fi xed-effects model, and the fixed-effects model is strictly a better choice. An F-test for the joint signifi cance of the dummies that form the fi xed effects is conducted fi rst. The null hypothesis that fi xed-effect dummies are "not signifi cant" is resoundingly rejected. 19 In addition, a Hausman test shows that the fi xed effects are correlated with other exogenous variables in the regression without the number of slots and table games, which suggests that the fixed-effects estimation procedure is more appropriate for this analysis. 20 Finally, given the panel nature of the data, there is potential for serial correlation of errors. Baltagi (2001) shows a Lagrange Multiplier test for fi rst-order serial correlation in residual terms for fi xed-effects models (Baltagi, 2001, 94-5 ). Baltagi's Lagrange Multiplier test fails to reject the existence of serial correlation under the assumption that residuals are AR(1). Given this evidence on the existence of serial correlation, the fi xed-effects model is estimated using an AR(1) procedure.
Panel regression results are shown in the last two rows of Table 2 and confi rm that gross gambling revenue, on average, will grow at the same rate as state income. Both estimates are statistically greater than zero but equal to one. The fi rst regression does not include the number of slots and table games and is run with data on ten states, excluding only Nevada. The second regression includes the number of slots and table games, which reduces data to six states, excluding New Jersey, Colorado, Connecticut and Louisiana, for which there are no data on slots and table games, and Nevada. 21 When we include Nevada in these regressions, elasticities decrease dramatically to 0.65 and 0.22 for Regression (1) and Regression (2), respectively, refl ecting Nevada's large sample size and low state income elasticity, as shown in Table 2 . Table 3 provides short-run elasticity estimates for state income. Specifi cally, it provides estimates of equation [3] allowing for differences in the short-run income elasticity and rate of adjustment depending on whether actual casino gambling revenue is above or below its long-run potential. It also provides estimates assuming symmetric elasticity and adjustment.
Short-Run Elasticity Estimates
The results in Table 3 demonstrate the importance of allowing for different short-run responses, depending on whether the tax base is above or below its long-run potential. For example, with no asymmetry, Nevada's short-run elasticity is 0.47 and statistically insignifi cant. Based on this estimate, one would conclude that Nevada's casino revenue experiences very little variability. Moreover, the error-correction term estimate of -0.53 indicates that any gap is closed in approximately two quarters. However, when examining the asymmetric estimates, one fi nds that the range in the values of the short-run elasticity is relatively large (-0.71 to 1.85). The negative value for the belowlong-run equilibrium estimate suggests a short-run countercyclical response to any change in state income. Moreover, the adjustment parameters suggest that more of the gap is closed each quarter.
All states, with the exception of Louisiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana, have short-run elasticity estimates that are statistically different from each other depending on whether the actual tax base is above or below its long-run potential. Likewise, as found by Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) when examining sales and income tax bases, the short-run elasticity when revenue is above its potential exceeds the elasticity when it is below. As with the long-run elasticity estimates, the short-run elasticity estimates for casino gambling, on average, lie in-between the short-run elasticity estimates for sales and income taxes. Specifi cally, the average below-equilibrium elasticity for gross gambling revenue with respect to state income (-0.45) is larger (in absolute value) than the average below-equilibrium income elasticity found by Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) for sales (0.149) and income (0.217), whereas the average above-equi-librium elasticity for gross gambling revenue (1.69) is smaller (1.804 and 2.663 for the above-equilibrium income elasticity of sales and income, respectively).
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The adjustment parameters vary substantially across states. For example, in most states the above-and below-equilibrium adjustment rates are statistically identical, whereas in two states (New Jersey and Missouri) the above-equilibrium adjustment parameter exceeds, in absolute value, the below-equilibrium value. In Iowa, the below-equilibrium adjustment is greater in absolute value. 
Adjustment to Equilibrium
Note: *, **, and *** represent signifi cance from zero at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All time-series regressions, except for Louisiana and New Jersey, include number of slot machines and It is difficult to generalize the estimates in Table 3 , but it is interesting to note that the adjustment to equilibrium estimates is statistically signifi cant in all cases when current revenues are below equilibrium, with the exception of Louisiana and Missouri. In contrast, less than half of the above-equilibrium estimates are signifi cant. This suggests that casino gambling revenues are quicker to recover when below potential than they are to decline when above, a fact that may be benefi cial for a state seeking to reduce downside risk in its tax base. Tables 4  and 5 show short-run elasticities for regional income and national income, respectively, and the results are generally similar to those in Table 3 . A comparison of the long-run elasticity estimates in Table 2 with the short-run results in Tables 3 through 5 does not reveal any distinct pattern. Hence, there is no evidence of a tradeoff between growth and variability in casino revenues. This is in line with the fi ndings from Dye and McGuire (1991) and Holcombe and Sobel (1997) , which we discussed in the second section.
Response to the Economic Shocks of 2001
The analysis above examined how gross casino gambling revenues grow and vary with changes in state, regional, and national income. Over most of the sample period, however, positive economic growth was the norm, limiting the ability to examine how gross casino gambling revenues behave in a recession or severe economic downturn. The only exception is the recession that occurred from March to November 2001, which clearly was exacerbated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . While such a short-lived and relatively shallow recession limits the ability to examine casino gambling's resilience to an economic downturn in the context of the error-correction model used above (see footnote 11), we can examine the growth rates of gross casino gambling revenues during the time surrounding these events. Dye (2004) found a signifi cant negative response in both state personal income and state tax revenues resulting from the 2001 recession. In particular, when examining the percentage change in per capita total tax revenues from the previous fi scal year, Dye (2004) (Missouri, Louisiana, Indiana, South Dakota, and Connecticut) experienced an increase, a notable pattern given that 46 of 50 states experienced a decline in overall revenue, including all fi ve of those that experienced growth in gross gambling revenue. Secondly, when gross gambling revenue does decline, it does so, on average, by less than other revenues. Dye (2004) reports that growth in real state tax revenues for FY 2001 was one percent, with a standard deviation of 3.9 percent. FY 2002, in contrast, had a decline of 4.9 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.3 percent. The corresponding figures for gross casino gambling revenue, in contrast, are a growth of 4.69 percent (standard deviation of 6.98 percent) and a decline of 0.14 percent (standard deviation of 3.74 percent). This is consistent with our fi nding that gross casino gambling revenue recovers more quickly when below its long-run potential. Lastly, the impact of the shocks of 2001 was not uniform across states. Destination resort states, particularly Nevada, were more negatively impacted than other communities. Revenue growth for Nevada 
Adjustment to Equilibrium
Note: *, **, and *** represent signifi cance from zero at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All time-series regressions, except for Louisiana and New Jersey, include number of slot machines and 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The current study examined the longand short-run income elasticity estimates of gross casino gambling revenue, a tax base that has been increasingly adopted by states seeking other sources of tax revenue. The long-run growth estimates suggest that gross gambling revenue as a tax base is more similar to personal income than taxable sales, although most estimates fall between these traditional tax bases. Results from the more mature markets of Nevada and Atlantic City, however, suggest that casino revenue growth may be limited, as these states have long-run income elasticity estimates that have decreased over time and are below their corresponding income elasticity estimates of taxable sales. This is something states should consider as they consider the long-run confi guration of their tax base 
Adjustment to Equilibrium
Note: *, **, and *** represent signifi cance from zero at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All time-series regressions, except for Louisiana and New Jersey, include number of slot machines and portfolios and consider the expansion of casino gambling. The short-run elasticity estimates are more diffi cult to generalize, but several interesting fi ndings stand out. First, when accounting for short-term variability, it is critical to allow for asymmetric elasticities and adjustments. Failure to do so may lead to erroneous conclusions about stability. Demonstrating this most clearly was the case of Nevada where the range in below-and above-equilibrium estimates was greatest when allowing for asymmetry but averaged out to be small and insignifi cant when failing to do so. Second, casino revenue, much like income and taxable sales, has a greater response to changes in income when above its longrun equilibrium. Third, casino gambling revenue's adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is faster when revenues are below their long-run potential. This rapid recovery from an economic downturn should make casino gambling appealing to states seeking to refi ll the tax coffers.
The current study, although limited strictly to gross casino gambling revenue, is unique in that the estimates derived are generated from the actual tax base rather than a proxy thereof. This is the fi rst study to our knowledge to do so. Moreover, this is one of the few studies to provide income elasticity estimates for casino gambling. This is important as states and countries around the world continue to look to casino gambling as a source of tax revenue and a means of diversifying their tax base. 
